This article examines behavior in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric forces. In this constant-sum game, two players simultaneously allocate their forces across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, the disadvantaged players often use a "guerilla warfare" strategy which stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of battlefields. The advantaged player often employs a "stochastic complete coverage" strategy, allocating random, but positive, force levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their forces equally across all battlefields. Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we examine behavior under both random pairing and fixed pairing protocols. Under the random pairing protocol, players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given battlefield across time. Under fixed pairing this correlation is significantly reduced, and disappears for the disadvantaged player in the auction treatment.
Introduction
This article examines behavior in the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric forces. In this constant-sum game, two players simultaneously allocate their endowments of forces across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. The probability of winning a battlefield depends on the forces allocated by both players to that field.
The function that maps the two players' force allocations into their respective probabilities of winning is called the contest success function (CSF). We examine two types of contest success functions (CSFs): the "auction" CSF, in which the player allocating the highest force to a battlefield wins that battlefield with certainty, and the "lottery" CSF, in which the probability of winning a battlefield equals the ratio of a player's force allocation to the sum of the players' force allocations in that battlefield.
The Colonel Blotto game is the prototype of models of strategic resource allocation across multiple dimensions. Originally formulated by Borel (1921) , it is among the first strategic situations to be subject to formal mathematical abstraction. Over the years, versions of the game have attracted the interest of prominent scholars across a wide range of disciplines, including Bellman (1969) , Blackett (1954 Blackett ( , 1958 , Shubik and Weber (1981) and Tukey (1949). Borel's original version employed an auction CSF and was solved for the special case of three battlefields and symmetric forces by Borel and Ville (1938) . Gross and Wagner (1950) , extended the Borel and Ville analysis of the case of symmetric forces to allow for any finite number of battlefields. Friedman (1958) provided a partial characterization of the solution to Borel's problem for n-battlefields and asymmetric forces. More recently, Roberson (2006) has applied the theory of copulas to prove the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs under the auction CSF for n-battlefields and arbitrary asymmetric forces and prove that uniform univariate marginal distributions are necessary for equilibrium over a wide range of endowments of forces. 1 To our knowledge, Friedman (1958) was also the first to examine the Blotto game under the lottery CSF and solved the game for n-battlefields and asymmetric forces.
2 A recent extension is Robson (2005) , who extends the analysis from the lottery CSF to more general CSF's of the ratio form in which the probability that player i wins the contest as a function of the two levels of expenditure x i and x j is This paper examines experimentally whether behavior conforms to the Nash equilibrium 4 predictions of the Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric budgets under the auction and lottery contest success functions. Under the auction CSF, as demonstrated by Roberson (2006) , if budgets are not too asymmetric there exists no pure Nash equilibrium strategies for this game.
The qualitative nature of the nondegenerate mixed equilibrium strategies that arise depends 1 See also Kvasov (2007) and Roberson and Kvasov (2008) , who examine "non-constant sum" Blotto games in which budgets are not use-it-or-lose-it, Golman and Page (2009) who examine Blotto games with payoffs nonlinear in the number of battlefields won and externalities across battlefields, and Hart (2008) who examines a Blotto game with discrete strategy spaces. 2 Friedman's results were obtained in the context of a game theoretic analysis of advertising expenditures. 3 Snyder (1989) examined a related game in which the CSF for each battlefield was of the type employed by Rosen (1986) and contained the lottery CSF as a special case. Snyder assumed no budget constraints, but instead a positive marginal cost of each unit force employed. He also examined two different objectives, one involving a payoff linear in the number of battlefields won and the other a payoff that was discontinuous when a majority of battlefields was won. 4 Since the games examined are constant sum, Nash equilibrium strategies are also optimal strategies.
critically on the ratio of the two players' budgets. For a wide range of budgets, including those examined in this paper, the equilibrium marginal distributions of each player's force allocation within each battlefield are uniquely determined. Disadvantaged players allocate zero force to a given battlefield with positive probability and then employ a uniform marginal distribution between zero and a common upper bound. Equilibrium strategies displaying these properties exist in which players use a "guerilla warfare" strategy which stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of battlefields. For the same range of the players' budgets, the advantaged player's equilibrium strategy must generate marginal distributions that are uniform over the complete support, which coincides with that of the disadvantaged player. Hence, equilibrium strategies for the advantaged player exhibit "stochastic complete coverage," allocating random, but positive, force levels across the battlefields.
The Colonel Blotto game with the lottery CSF applied in each battlefield yields markedly different equilibrium predictions. For all positive budget pairs of the two players, the unique equilibrium requires that players employ pure strategies that divide their budgets equally across the n-battlefields.
The results of our experiment confirm that for both types of contest success functions behavior conforms substantially to the predictions of equilibrium. In the auction treatment, the disadvantaged players often use a "guerilla warfare" strategy which stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of battlefields. The advantaged player often employs a "stochastic complete coverage" strategy, allocating random, but positive, force levels across the battlefields. As in previous studies of non-constant sum contests, behavior is more dichotomous than predicted by the equilibrium, with players choosing either very low allocations or moderately high allocations to a given battlefield more often than predicted. Under the lottery treatment, there is support for the equilibrium prediction of a constant allocation across battlefields for both players. Deviations from equilibrium behavior by employing either greater dispersion of forces across battlefields in the lottery treatment or less dispersion across battlefields (or within a battlefield, across time) in the auction treatment are associated with lower payoffs.
Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we examine behavior under both random pairing and fixed pairing protocols. Under the random pairing protocol, players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given battlefield across time. Under fixed pairing this correlation is significantly reduced, and disappears for the disadvantaged player in the auction treatment.
In section 2, we describe our experimental design. Section 3 presents the results of our experiment and compares and contrasts these results to the corresponding theoretical benchmarks. Section 4 concludes.
Experimental Environment

Experimental Design
Our experimental design is based on the constant-sum Colonel Blotto game, in which two players simultaneously allocate their forces across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. We study two treatments: the auction treatment, in which the player with the highest force allocation to a battlefield wins that battlefield with certainty, and the lottery treatment, in which the probability of winning a battlefield equals the ratio of a player's force allocation to the sum of the players' force allocations in that battlefield. The auction treatment is based on Roberson (2006) and the lottery treatment is based on Robson (2005) . The structure of the game is shown in Figure 2 .1. We use 8 battlefields (boxes) and two players with asymmetric forces. The force endowment for player 1 is 200 tokens and for player 2 it is 120 tokens.
Figure 2.1 -The Structure of the Game
Given the specification of the model, under the lottery treatment, there exists unique pure strategy equilibrium where players divide their endowments equally across all boxes. In our case, the advantaged player 1 allocates 25 tokens, whereas the disadvantaged player 2 allocates 15 tokens to each box. It is straightforward to calculate the expected payoff in the lottery treatment.
The expected payoff per box is equal to the probability of winning that box. Hence, player 1's expected payoff is 25/(25+15) = 0.625 and player 2's expected payoff is 0.375. Under the auction treatment, there exists no pure strategy equilibrium. In the mixed strategy equilibrium player 1 allocates random, but positive, number of tokens across all boxes, whereas player 2 stochastically allocates zero tokens to some boxes with probability 0.4. The expected payoff for the advantaged player is 0.7 and for the disadvantaged player it is 0.3. The outline of the experimental design along with the theoretical predictions is shown in 
Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics
Laboratory. The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
A total of 128 subjects participated in eight sessions. All subjects were Purdue University undergraduate students who participated in only one session of this study. Some students had participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research. Table 2 .2 summarizes the design of the experiment. We employ two treatment variables: CSF (lottery versus auction) and matching protocol (strangers versus partners). Each experimental session had 16 subjects and it proceeded in three parts. In the first part subjects made 15 choices in simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002 Each subject played in the lottery treatment for 15 periods and then 15 periods in the auction treatment. The sequence was varied so that half the sessions had the auction treatment first, and half had the lottery treatment first.
At the beginning of each treatment subjects were given instructions, available in Appendix, and the experimenter read the instructions aloud. In the first period of the experiment subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned as player 1 or player 2. All subjects remained in the same role assignment throughout the entire experiment. In sessions 1-4, where we employed strangers matching protocol, subjects of opposite assignments were randomly repaired each period to form a two player group. In sessions 5-8, where we employed partners matching protocol, subjects were paired with the same participant for the entire experiment. Each period, player 1 received 200 tokens and player 2 received 120 tokens. Both players where asked to choose how to allocate their tokens across 8 boxes. Player 1 could allocate any number of tokens between 0 and 200 (including 0.5 decimal points) to each box. The total number of tokens had to sum to 200 or the computer did not accept allocations of player 1. The same rule was also applied to player 2. After all subjects submitted their allocations, the computer informed which boxes they won. The winner of each box received 1 franc (experimental currency). In the lottery treatment, the winner of each box was chosen according to the lottery CSF. A simple lottery was used to explain how the computer chose the winner. In the auction treatment, the player who allocated more tokens to a particular box was chosen as a winner of that box. In case both players allocated the same amount to the same box, the computer always chose player 1 as a winner of that box. After all subjects submitted their allocations, the computer displayed the allocation of tokens by the opponent, period earnings in francs, and cumulative earnings on the outcome screen.
At the end of the experiment, 1 out of 15 decisions subjects made in part one was randomly selected for payment. Subjects were also paid for 15 periods in lottery treatment and for 15 periods in auction treatment. The earnings were converted into US dollars at the end of the experiment. For player 1, the conversion rate was 8 francs to $1, and for player 2, the conversion rate was 4 francs to $1. The conversion rates were private information. On average, subjects earned $25 each which was paid in cash. The experimental sessions lasted for about 100 minutes. Table 3 .1 summarizes average allocation of tokens to each box and average payoffs.
Results
General Results
Players 1 and 2, on average, allocate similar amount of tokens to each box. Nevertheless, there seem to be a slight allocation bias towards the boxes 1-4. One explanation for this bias comes from the theory of "focal point" introduced by Schelling (1960) . In our experiment all 8 boxes were symmetric from a strategic standpoint but they were located in a row from left-to-right.
Thus, for people whose native language reads from left-to-right, allocating more tokens to the boxes 1-4 (on the left) is natural. At the end of the experiment we conducted a questionnaire in which we ask all subjects to state whether in their native language they write from right-to-left or from left-to-right. Around 90% of all subjects answered that they write from left-to-right.
The first support for the "Colonel Blotto" theory comes from the fact that the actual payoffs in Table 3 .1 are very close to the predicted payoffs in Table 2 .1. Specifically, the theory predicts that player 1's expected payoff is 0.63 in the lottery treatment and 0.70 in the auction treatment. The actual payoffs are 0.64 and 0.71. The expected payoff of player 2 is also consistent with the payoff predicted by the theory. 6 This result is striking because the majority of experimental studies documented that the payoffs do not confirm to theoretical predictions in contests (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006; Sheremeta, 2007 Sheremeta, , 2008 . In contrast to the previous studies, however, our experiments investigate a constant-sum game, where players can not over-dissipate. In the absence of over-dissipation, we find that the actual payoffs are consistent with the theoretical payoffs. Table 2 .1 requires a constant allocation across boxes for both players.
There is support for this prediction as the majority of player 1's allocations are centered at 25 while the majority of player 2's allocations are centered at 15. Contrary to the equilibrium predictions, there is a substantial variance in the allocation of tokens. This variance is consistent with previous experimental findings of the contest literature (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; Sheremeta, 2007 Sheremeta, , 2008 . Several explanations have been offered. The first common argument is that players may play an asymmetric equilibrium instead of a symmetric equilibrium. Another explanation comes from the probabilistic nature of the lottery CSF. Each period, the computer makes a random draw to determine a winner of each box. The random draw in period t-1 may affect player's behavior in period t which can explain why there is substantial variance in allocations in all periods of the experiment. In the auction treatment, equilibrium requires for player 1 to uniformly randomize over the interval between 0 and 50. On the other hand, player 2 should allocate 0 with probability 0.4, and with probability 0.6 he should uniformly randomize over the interval between 0 and 50.
From Figures 3.2 we can see that behavior conforms substantially to the predictions of equilibrium. The interval over which players are randomizing is between 0 and 50, with only 0.5% of allocations above 50 tokens. Consistent with the theory, the advantaged player 1 employs a "stochastic complete coverage" strategy, allocating random, but positive, number of tokens across the boxes. The disadvantaged player 2 uses a "guerilla warfare" strategy which stochastically allocates zero tokens to a subset of boxes. As in previous studies of non-constant sum contests (Barut et al, 2002; Gneezy and Smorodinsky, 2006) , behavior is more dichotomous than predicted by the equilibrium, with players choosing either very low allocations or moderately high allocations to a given box more often than predicted. The theoretical predictions as well as the observed behavior in the lottery treatment are very different from the auction treatment. The difference also comes from the observation that players use decimals in allocation of tokens in the auction treatment more often than in the lottery treatment. Figure 3 .3 shows the fraction of players who use decimal points in their allocations. Both players 1 and 2 in the auction treatment use decimal points more frequently than the same players 1 and 2 in the lottery treatment. This finding is mainly due to the deterministic nature of the auction CSF, requiring players to use the entire strategy space.
Another observation from Figure 3 .3 is that in the lottery treatment player 2 uses decimal points more often than player 1. This difference can be explained by the fact that the tie-braking rule in our experiment favors player 1. 
Strangers versus Partners ("Hot Box")
In non-constant sum games repetition with the same set of players (partners) may change the nature of equilibrium since subjects have incentives to collude (Kreps et al., 1982) . A common way to deal with this is to randomly re-group players (strangers) after each iteration of the game. 7 Contrary to the standard auction literature (Klemperer, 2002) , collusion is not an issue in our experiment since the Colonel Blotto game presented in this article is a constant sum game.
The gain for one player is a loss for another. However, after we ran the first set of experiments, using conventional strangers protocol, we realized that several very interesting behavioral patterns were cause by this matching protocol. Specifically, we found that players have significant serial correlation in allocations to a given box ("Hot Box") across periods. We also found that in the auction treatment some players continuously employ the same strategy ("Good Ol' Rock") over different periods. We will address the latter finding in the next section. There is no general agreement on how matching protocol influences individual behavior. In public good games, some studies find more cooperation among strangers, some find more by partners, and some fail to find any difference at all (Andreoni and Croson, 2007) . In auctions, there is some evidence that subjects cooperate more under the partners matching protocol (Lugovskyy et al., 2008) .
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The idea of a "Hot Box" is clearly illustrated in Figure 3 .4, where we display the allocation by player 1 to each box over 15 periods in the auction treatment. This player 1 received the highest payoff among all players under the strangers matching protocol. The size of the bubble indicates the size of the allocation. For example, the biggest bubbles on the graph correspond to the allocation of 40 tokens, while the smallest bubbles correspond to the allocation of 10 tokens. The "+" or "-" correspond to winning or losing. Note that this player 1 systematically allocates a certain amount of tokens to a particular box across periods (we have highlighted these boxes). It is hard to conclude whether this behavior results from randomization over periods or from some type of individual bias.
To control for individual and period effects, we provide a multivariate analysis. To capture heterogeneity across individuals we use random effect models with individual subject effects. We also include dummy variables to capture session effects. The regressions are of the following form:
where allocation is player i's allocation of tokens to the n-th box in a period t, own-lag denotes player i's allocation to the same box in the previous period, win-lag denotes whether player i won that box in the previous period, and opponent-lag denotes the previous allocation to that box by the opponent. The box1234 is a dummy variable which is designed to capture allocation bias towards the boxes 1-4. All regressions also include dummy-variables to capture session effects.
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 3 .2. Specifications (1) and (2) we use the data from the lottery treatment while in specification (3) and (4) we use the data from the auction treatment.
In all specifications the own-lag coefficient is positive and significant, indicating the presence of the "Hot Box". Several experimental studies have shown that winning the contest in period t-1 affects player's behavior in period t (Sheremeta, 2007 (Sheremeta, , 2008 . To capture this dynamic aspect of the game, we also used an interaction between own-lag and win-lag. The win-lag variable takes on the value of 1 if subject won the box in period t-1 and 0 otherwise. In specifications (3) and (4) the interaction between own-lag and win-lag is positive and significant. 8 It is even more surprising since in both specifications we control for the number of tokens allocated to each box by the opponent in period t-1. The opponent-lag variable is positive and significant only for player 1, indicating that player 1 allocates more tokens to the boxes where his opponent allocated more tokens in period t-1. In each regression we include dummies to control for for session effects All models include a random effects error structure, with individual subject effects Another finding from Table 3 .2 is the allocation bias effect. In specifications (1) and (3), the box1234 variable has a positive and significant effect on allocation. This means that subjects allocate more tokens to boxes 1-4 than to boxes 5-6. As we mentioned earlier, this finding can be explained by the fact that 90% of our subjects write from left-to-right. We re-estimated all specifications in Table 3 .2 by controlling for language differences. However, we did not find any significant differences. Note that the inverse of a period trend by location is not significant in any of the specifications. This suggests that subjects' bias towards boxes 1-4 does not disappear with experience. The presence of a "Hot Box" and the location bias under strangers matching protocol motivated us to run sessions with partners matching protocol. Next we examine the behavior of the subjects under partners matching protocol. In each regression we include dummies to control for for session effects All models include a random effects error structure, with individual subject effects As before, to capture individual differences we provide a multivariate analysis by employing random effect models with individual subject effects. Results of the estimation in Table 3 .3 support our initial observation. The effect of the "Hot Box" is much lower under the partners protocol which is illustrated by a much lower own-lag coefficient. Note that the own-lag coefficient is not significant for player 2 in the auction treatment. On the other hand, the box1234 coefficient is still high and significant indicating that partners protocol does not reduce the allocation bias in the Colonel Blotto games. In a repeated constant-sum game, employing the same strategy each period is not a good idea because the opponent will eventually find it out and will employ the best response. This is what happens to Bart. In the game of Rock-Paper-Scissors with Lisa, he always plays "Rock", which Lisa knows well. As a result Lisa employs the best response "Paper" and always wins the game. But, had it been the case that Bart plays Rock-Paper-Scissors to different people in each period, then playing his "Good ol' rock" strategy can work out very well since the opponents do not have enough periods to figure out his pure strategy. In other words, a pure strategy in a repeated constant-sum game with randomly chosen opponents (strangers) in different period can appear to be mixed strategy and earn a player higher payoff than that of playing the same strategy with fixed opponent (partners).
The Determinants of
We found that the "Good ol' rock" strategy is frequently employed by subjects under strangers protocol. Specifically, we found that in the auction treatment a number of players employ the same pure strategy over different periods and earn substantial payoffs. This type of behavior is significantly reduced when we employ partners protocol. The support for this finding can be found in Figure 3 .5 which displays the cumulative distribution of differences within the same box in the auction treatment. Both the advantaged and the disadvantaged players randomize more when they are paired with a fixed partner instead of a stranger. Around 50% of the advantaged players do not change their strategy (difference within the same box is 0) while paired with strangers. For disadvantaged players, the percentage is around 35%. But, when paired up with the same partner, the percentage goes down to around 20% for both players. Note that the CDF under the partners protocol first order dominates the CDF under strangers protocol. The other interesting result under the two different protocols is the effect of randomization on the payoff. We find that the deviations from equilibrium behavior by employing either greater dispersion of forces across boxes in the lottery treatment or less dispersion across boxes (or within a boxes, across time) in the auction treatment are associated with lower payoffs. To show this, we estimate random effect models of the following form:
where payoff is player i's payoff in a period t. The between-boxes variable is defined as the absolute difference between the tokens allocated to a specific box and the mean. So, for player 1 (player 2) this variable indicates how far is the allocation to a specific box from 25 (15). The between^2-boxes variable is defined as the square of the difference between the tokens allocated to a specific box and the mean. The within-boxes variable is defined as the absolute difference between the tokens allocated to the same box in periods t and t-1. The within^2-boxes variable is defined as the square of the difference between the tokens allocated to the same box in period t and period t-1. in parentheses. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1% In each regression we include dummies to control for for session effects All models include a random effects error structure, with individual subject effects The estimation results for treatments which used strangers protocol are shown in Table   3 .4. The between-boxes variable in specifications (1) and (2) is negative and significant. This indicates that, under the partners matching protocol, the deviation from the mean allocation of 25 in the lottery treatment significantly decreases player 1's and 2's payoffs. This finding indicates that there is a strong incentive for subjects to converge to the equilibrium play. By doing so, subjects can increase their payoffs in the lottery treatment. In the auction treatment the opposite effect takes place. The deviation from the mean suggests that players are randomizing and therefore they should earn higher payoffs. The between-boxes variable in specifications (3) and (4) is positive and significant, indicating that by deviating from the mean, players 1 and 2 earn significantly higher payoffs in the auction treatment. It misleading, however, that by increasing the magnitude of the between-boxes variable to the extreme will generate the highest payoff. If that was true then the best strategy for player 1 would be to place 200 to one box and 0 to other boxes. To control for the fact that too much deviation from the mean can be harmful, in specifications (5) and (6), we include the between^2-boxes and the within^2-boxes variables. As in specifications (3) and (4), the between-boxes coefficient is still positive and significant.
However, the between^2-boxes coefficient is negative, indicating that reasonable deviation from the mean increases the payoff while unreasonable deviation from the mean decreases the payoff.
Within boxes deviations over periods (captured by within-boxes and within^2-boxes variables)
does not come out to be significant in any of the specifications, indicating that the "Good ol'
Rock" strategy does not affect the payoff and thus can be optimal under the strangers protocol. In each regression we include dummies to control for for session effects All models include a random effects error structure, with individual subject effects Table 3 .5 reports the estimation results under the partners protocol. The interesting difference from Table 3 .4 is reflected in the estimation of specifications (3) through (6). Because of the partners protocol, the "Good ol' Rock" strategy does not work well in the auction treatment. This is reflected in specifications (3) and (4) by the significant within-boxes variable.
Randomizing within the same box over the periods significantly increases the payoff for both players. Specifications (5) and (6) confirm that too much randomization, even in within box, has negative effect on payoff.
Conclusions
This is the first experimental investigation of the classic Colonel Blotto games. Colonel
Blotto is a two-player constant sum game where the players with asymmetric forces simultaneously allocate their forces across n-battlefields, with the objective of maximizing the expected number of battlefields won. To examine the probability of winning a battlefield, we consider two treatments by employing two distinct contest success functions: auction CSF and lottery CSF. Under the lottery CSF, where the probability of winning a battlefield equals the ratio of a player's force allocation to the sum of the players' force allocations in that battlefield, theory predicts that each player should equally divide their resources across all battlefields. The experimental results support this prediction. Deviations from the symmetric equilibrium can be partially explained by the probabilistic nature of the lottery CSF. It is also observed that deviation from equilibrium behavior is accompanied with lower payoffs. Under the auction treatment, according to theory the lower resource player stochastically allocates zero forces to a subset of battlefields and the advantaged player allocates random, but positive, force levels across the battlefields. Again, the data support this theoretical prediction and deviations from equilibrium behavior by less dispersion across battlefields (or within a battlefield, across time) are associated with lower payoffs.
Due to the constant-sum nature of the game, we employed partners and strangers matching protocols. We find that matching protocols have significant effects on subject behavior under auction treatment. Under strangers protocol subjects are more prone to be trapped into a "hot box", where winning a particular box in a period encourages the subject to place more bid in that particular box in the next period. The subjects often also play a "good ol' rock" strategy under strangers protocol. Here instead of randomizing the allocation over different fields the players employs the same pure strategy to different opponents over different periods. Occurrence of both "hot box" and "good ol' rock" strategy significantly diminishes under the partners protocol. To our knowledge, this is the first study to explicitly recognize such effects of the strangers protocol under constant sum games and the results encourage for further analyses in this area.
The Colonel Blotto game is one of the very easy to understand yet analytically challenging games. Because of its simple structure, the game can be applied to many real life situations such as war between two countries in multiple battlefields, defense strategies against terrorism when terrorists target several important locations, electoral expenditure on multiple seats, R&D expenditure on several prospective patents -to name a few. It took as long as 85 years to have a complete characterization of equilibria in this game. Yet, it took only one hour for subjects who were unfamiliar with this game to find these equilibria.
It is very encouraging that experimental results strongly support this computationally challenging game. It also suggests that experiments can be used extensively to provide excellent guidance for theoretically challenging problems such as Colonel Blotto games. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 2 $1 $3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 11,12,13,14 $0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2 YOUR DECISION
The second part of the experiment consists of 15 decision-making periods. At the beginning of each period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group which consists of two participants: participant 1 and participant 2. At the beginning of the first period you will be randomly assigned either as participant 1 or as participant 2. You will remain in the same role assignment throughout the entire experiment. So, if you are assigned as participant 1 then you will stay as participant 1 throughout the entire experiment.
Each period, participant 1 will receive 200 tokens and participant 2 will receive 120 tokens. Both participants will choose how to allocate their tokens to 8 boxes, as shown on a decision screen below.
Participant 1 can allocate any number of tokens between 0 and 200 (including 0.5 decimal points) to each box. The total number of tokens in all boxes must sum to 200 or the computer will not accept the decision of participant 1. Similarly, participant 2 can allocate any number of tokens between 0 and 120 (including 0.5 decimal points). The total number of tokens in all boxes must sum to 120 or the computer will not accept the decision of participant 2.
YOUR EARNINGS
After each participant has made his or her decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. Your period earnings are proportional to the number of boxes you win. For each box you win you will receive 1 franc.
Your earnings = Number of boxes you won × 1 franc So, if you win all 8 boxes, you will receive 8 francs for this period. If you do not win any of the boxes, you will receive 0 francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _ X _ francs to _1_ dollar. Your conversion rates are your private information. All conversion rates for participant 1 are equal and all conversion rates for participant 2 are equal. However, the conversion rates are different for participants 1 and 2. Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn. What you earn depends partly on your decision and partly on the decision of the other participant with whom you are paired.
The more tokens you allocate to a particular box, the more likely you are to win that box. The more tokens the other participant allocates to the same box, the less likely you are to win that box. Specifically, for each token you allocate to a particular box you will receive 10 lottery tickets. At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by you and the other participant in your group. The owner of the drawn ticket wins the box and receives 1 franc for that box. Thus, your chance of winning a particular box is given by the number of tokens you allocate to that box divided by the total number of tokens you and the other participant allocate to that box.
Chance of winning a box = Number of tokens you allocate to that box Number of tokens you allocate + Number of tokens the other participant allocates to that box In case both participants allocate zero to the same box, the computer will randomly chose a winner of that box. Therefore, each participant has the same chance of winning the box.
Example of the Random Draw
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer makes a random draw. Let's say participant 1 and participant 2 allocate their tokens to eight boxes in the following way. Participant 1 allocates 20.5 tokens to box 1, 19.5 tokens to box 2, 25 tokens box 3, 25 tokens to box 4, 0 tokens to box 5, 0 tokens to box 6, 40.5 tokens to box 7, and 69.5 tokens to box 8 (total of 200 tokens). Participant 2 allocates 15 tokens to box 1, 15 tokens to box 2, 10 tokens to box 3, 10 tokens to box 4, 0 tokens to box 5, 40 tokens to box 6, 15.5 tokens to box 7, and 14.5 tokens to box 8 (total of 120 tokens). Therefore, the computer will assigns lottery tickets to participant 1 and to participant 2 according to their allocation of tokens.
For example, in box 1, the computer will assign 205 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 150 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer will randomly draw one lottery ticket out of 355 (205+150). As you can see, participant 1 has a higher chance of winning box 1: 20.5/(20.5+15) = 0.58. Participant 2 has lower chance of winning box 1: 15/(20.5+15) = 0.42.
Similarly, in box 6, the computer will assign 0 lottery tickets to participant 1 and 400 lottery tickets to participant 2. Then the computer will randomly draw one lottery ticket out of 400 (0+400). As you can see, participant 1 has no chance of winning box 6: 0/(0+40) = 0.0. Therefore, participant 2 will win box 6 for sure: 40/(0+40) = 1.0.
After all participants allocate their tokens and press the OK button, the computer will make a random draw for each box separately and independently. Note that you can never guarantee that you will win a particular box. However, by increasing your allocation to that box, you can increase your chance of winning that box. The random draw made by the computer will decide which boxes you win. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on how many boxes you won.
At the end of each period, the allocation of your tokens, the allocation of the other participant's tokens, which boxes you win, your period earnings, and your cumulative earnings are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading.
IMPORTANT NOTES
At the beginning of the first period you will be randomly assigned either as participant 1 or as participant 2. You will remain in the same role assignment throughout the entire experiment. Each consecutive period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant of opposite assignment. So, if you are participant 1, each period you will be randomly re-paired with another participant 2. If you are participant 2, each period you will be randomly repaired with another participant 1.
At the end of the experiment you will convert your cumulative earnings into a payment in U.S. dollars. Your conversion rates are your private information. All conversion rates for participant 1 are equal and all conversion rates for participant 2 are equal. However, the conversion rates are different for participants 1 and 2.
